Two major infrastructure projects designed to bypass the Suez Canal remain unable to operate as genuine alternatives during regional crises, according to a report published September 15, 2026 by Manara Magazine. Author Eric Guiochon examines how the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and Iraq Development Road (IDR) responded to shipping disruptions in the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz, finding that neither corridor possesses the complete logistics capacity needed to absorb diverted trade. The analysis reveals a sharp distinction between routes that exist on paper and those ready to function when sea lanes close.
The Red Sea attacks that began in late 2023 caused tonnage through the Suez Canal to drop by roughly 70% compared with mid-December levels, while arrivals at the Cape of Good Hope jumped 89%, the report notes, citing UNCTAD data from June 2024. The detour around Africa added approximately 3,000 nautical miles and about ten extra days to shipping times, pushing the Shanghai Containerised Freight Index to more than double between late 2023 and mid-2024. The Strait of Hormuz crisis that started in February 2026 proved even more disruptive: oil shipments that had climbed to 20 million barrels daily in early July fell to around 12 million later that month, with global oil stocks declining by 410 million barrels between late February and late July. Six months into the Hormuz conflict, the International Maritime Organization recorded 70 confirmed attacks on vessels, 19 seafarer deaths, and up to 400 ships carrying roughly 6,000 crew members trapped in the Gulf. In 2025, the strait had carried about 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products each day—equivalent to approximately 25% of global seaborne oil trade—and close to 20% of worldwide LNG shipments.
The report finds that the IDR, estimated at around $17 billion and agreed upon in April 2024, still hasn't moved beyond detailed design work. In February 2026, Iraq's Ministry of Transport reported progress rates of 88% for rail and 78% for road, but these figures referred to planning studies rather than actual construction, the analysis states. Contractors still needed to be chosen before building could start. The original four-party agreement envisioned a first phase completed in 2028; Iraqi officials later pushed that to 2029, then to 2031, and by April 2026 were still working on draft legislation to establish the corridor's legal framework. The IMEC faces different obstacles: the United Arab Emirates operates 900 kilometers of operational freight rail linking the Saudi border to Fujairah and serving eleven terminals plus four ports, while Saudi Arabia runs approximately 2,750 kilometers of Northern network track and some 1,775 kilometers of Eastern network. Yet the report emphasizes that these national systems don't connect across borders—the Saudi Northern Network reaches Qurayyat near Jordan but stops there, and the December 2025 GCC agreement to link member railways remained focused on implementation planning as of April 2026.
The core problem isn't whether rail tracks exist in isolation but whether goods can move continuously from port to port without interruption, the report explains. Cargo arriving from India must be unloaded in the Gulf, transferred to rail networks crossing multiple borders before reaching the Mediterranean, then reloaded onto Europe-bound ships—each step requiring transhipment facilities, coordinated operators, customs clearance, and transit agreements that aren't yet in place. The 2023 IMEC memorandum specifies neither a definitive route, construction timeline, nor binding financial commitments, stipulating only that participants draft an action plan within sixty days of signing. For trade originating in Asia, the IDR can't escape dependence on the Strait of Hormuz because Al-Faw port sits at the head of the Gulf. The IMEC's vulnerability depends on which UAE port serves as entry point: Jebel Ali or Khalifa would maintain Hormuz exposure, while Fujairah on the eastern coast would reduce it. The comparison with existing sea routes highlights the gap: in 2024, shipping companies immediately rerouted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope because that capacity already existed, requiring no new ports, railways, or agreements. As of 2026, neither land corridor can pass the same test.
The report concludes that diversifying routes doesn't automatically create backup capacity when disruption strikes. The UAE response to the 2026 Hormuz crisis—increasing use of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan ports east of the strait while GCC leaders called for accelerated rail completion—suggests the real challenge isn't drawing alternative routes on maps but ensuring simultaneous availability of multiple access points when one fails. The crises haven't demonstrated corridor failure, the analysis states, but have exposed what these projects must ultimately prove: their ability to function as genuine fallback routes when existing infrastructure becomes unavailable. Until cross-border rail connections operate and legal frameworks are finalized, the corridors remain a series of disconnected national networks rather than working alternatives to maritime passages.