Indiana is moving toward a taxpayer-backed stadium package worth up to $1 billion in public bonds for the Chicago Bears, a franchise valued at more than $8 billion, according to a June 25, 2026 analysis from the Pacific Research Institute. The report argues that Indiana's approach isn't free-market competition but rather a special financing structure that puts public risk behind private profit. The state created the Northwest Indiana Stadium Authority specifically to facilitate the deal, giving it power to issue bonds, acquire land, and negotiate a long-term lease with the team.
The financial structure breaks down this way: Indiana would issue up to $1 billion in public bonds, while the Bears say they'll contribute $2 billion privately for the Hammond stadium project. The stadium authority would own the building and lease it to the Bears for decades. Under Senate Bill 27, the Bears would have the option to purchase the stadium for just $1 once the bonds are paid off. Local admissions, food and beverage, and hotel taxes would be used to repay the debt. The authority was created through SB 27 with powers to issue bonds, acquire land, and negotiate the team's lease terms.
According to the report's author Anthony Velasquez, the deal means "taxpayers would carry the risk while the franchise captures much of the upside." The report finds that despite claims about visitor taxes paying for the stadium, "it is still public financing" because the public owns the structure and shoulders the debt burden. Velasquez writes that "government is putting its thumb on the scale in a way no ordinary business could hope to receive," contrasting the Bears' special treatment with the normal regulatory environment other businesses face. The analysis references research by Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist in "Sports, Jobs, and Taxes," which found little evidence that publicly subsidized stadiums generate reasonable returns for taxpayers.
The report explains that stadium subsidies are typically defended as economic development but concentrate benefits among owners, developers, and politically connected interests while spreading costs across the public. The problem isn't that Illinois lost the Bears—the state's tax system is complicated, its approval process is slow, and politics made the Arlington Heights path harder than needed. Instead, the core issue is what happens when wealthy franchises make states compete over who will build the most favorable public financing structure. The report points to Oracle Park in San Francisco as an alternative model: a largely privately financed stadium where surrounding development followed private investment without special public backing. Rather than picking winners and making one $8 billion business the centerpiece of a special tax and bond structure, the report argues, real competition between states should mean lower costs, simpler taxes, and a predictable path to build for everyone.
The report concludes that if the Bears want to build in Hammond, they should be free to do it—and if fans, investors, developers, and local businesses see value, they should be free to build around it privately. What shouldn't happen is government making one private business worth more than $8 billion the center of special treatment while everyone else plays by normal rules. Illinois's refusal to rush a special deal was "a rare 'broken clock is right twice a day' moment," but Indiana's response shows how economic development suffers when localities engage in bidding wars that provide special treatment for the loudest and most mobile interests. The bottom line: taxpayers shouldn't be put further behind one franchise's stadium dream.

