Local governments across the United States collected $8.3 billion in fines and forfeitures in fiscal year 2022, with some small towns generating more revenue from law enforcement penalties than from taxes. A new report from Reason Foundation, published June 25, 2026, analyzed audited financial statements from more than 10,000 cities and counties to reveal which jurisdictions have become dangerously dependent on tickets, fines, and asset seizures to fund basic operations. The analysis identified 275 jurisdictions across 25 states that collected more than 10 cents in fines for every dollar of general revenue in fiscal year 2023—and 42 cities where fines exceeded 50% of general revenue.
The geographic concentration is striking. Arkansas, Illinois, New York, Tennessee, and Georgia lead all states in the share of local general revenue derived from fines and forfeitures, each exceeding 0.65%, according to Census Bureau data from fiscal year 2022. Eight of the 10 states with the highest reliance are in the South or South-Central region. Louisiana, Georgia, Tennessee, Illinois, and Oklahoma together account for nearly three-quarters of high-reliance cities. McNary and Port Vincent, both in Louisiana, top the list at 291% and 275% of general revenue from fines, respectively—meaning these towns collect nearly three dollars in fines for every dollar they raise through conventional taxes and other sources. Seven of the top 10 cities are in Louisiana. On a per capita basis, 41 cities collected more than $500 per resident in fines in fiscal year 2023, led by Linndale, Ohio, at $8,885 per resident, followed by Robeline, Louisiana ($2,987), Ocean Beach, New York ($2,970), and Georgetown, Louisiana ($2,933). At the county level, Taliaferro County, Georgia, leads all counties at $762 per resident, with Georgia accounting for five of the top 10 counties.
"Fiscal dependence on enforcement revenue produces measurable changes in policing behavior," the report states. The authors write that research shows counties and cities increase traffic citations following revenue shortfalls, and that jurisdictions collecting higher shares of revenue from fines have lower crime clearance rates. According to the report, when resources are diverted toward revenue generation, other public safety priorities suffer. The U.S. Department of Justice's 2015 investigation of Ferguson, Missouri, found that city officials routinely pressured police to increase citation revenue, fueling unconstitutional policing. The report profiles five case studies—Henderson, Louisiana; Poulan, Georgia; Turner County, Georgia; Seat Pleasant, Maryland; and Stringtown, Oklahoma—showing what structural fiscal dependence looks like in practice and why it's proven so difficult to eliminate.
The conflict of interest is structural. When local governments rely on law enforcement and courts as essential revenue sources, police departments shift from public safety to revenue collection, and the incentive to protect and serve gets replaced by the incentive to write tickets. The report notes that cities with their own municipal courts collect between 62% and 98% more in fines and forfeitures than comparable cities without their own courts—in small jurisdictions, the same officials who control the budget also control the court. Prior reform efforts have largely failed because they respond to specific scandals without addressing the underlying fiscal incentive. About half of all states have enacted police quota bans, but definitional ambiguities, broad exceptions, and the absence of meaningful enforcement mechanisms have left officer behavior largely unchanged. Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Maryland have each enacted revenue caps, but narrow definitions invite evasion. Missouri's Macks Creek Law has been revised multiple times over three decades in response to persistent evasion, even after the Ferguson investigation exposed its limitations.
The report concludes with six recommendations, including comprehensive caps on all enforcement revenue with mandatory reporting and diversion of excess revenue, strengthened quota bans with centralized reporting systems for officers to flag violations, elimination of municipal courts in small jurisdictions, and state assumption of court funding from general revenues rather than user fees. The authors argue that reform legislation should include statutory requirements for independent external evaluation using experimental or quasi-experimental methods to determine whether specific reforms actually change enforcement behavior or improve public safety outcomes. Durable reform requires both well-designed revenue caps and the enforcement infrastructure to make them stick—without it, taxation by citation will continue to undermine public safety and erode public trust.